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INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property has an exclusion problem.  Much of the current 
controversy over intellectual property appears to stem from the excessive 
exclusion that intellectual property law affords the holders of rights—rights that 
derogate from the public domain and prevent what would otherwise be use that 
does not directly harm anyone.  To the economist, it is the nature of information 
as a resource that causes us our ambivalence about exclusion rights to 
information: if information can be consumed at zero marginal cost, exclusion 
is an unalloyed bad.  The only rationale for intellectual property would be as an 
incentive to produce the information in the first place, but once it is produced, 
we implement exclusion only with regret and should not do so if there is a 
cheaper way to provide an incentive for the production of information.  Given 
that exclusion looks like a colossal waste, many would hold that one or more 
of these alternatives—from prizes to social recognition—simply has to be 
better.1 
And intellectual property is not the only area in which exclusion proves 
 
 *  Fessenden Professor of Law and Director of the Project on the Foundations of Private Law, 
Harvard Law School.    I thank Andrew Lewis for excellent research assistance.  All errors are mine. 
1.  See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 
(2008); see also JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008). 
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controversial.  As with information, many would claim that property rights of 
any sort in water, and especially those involving prior appropriation as in the 
American West, are inherently wrong and violate human rights.2  Similar ire is 
directed against proposals for property rights in the radio spectrum and on the 
Internet.3 
From these perspectives, property itself would appear to be the problem.  It 
is property that erects the metaphorical fences around information, spectrum, 
water, and other resources with public goods characteristics; it is, therefore, 
property that so many would like to do away with. 
In this lecture, I would like to propose a somewhat different diagnosis.  
Property is indeed at the heart of these questions over rights in fluid resources.  
However, I will argue that the picture of property is incomplete.  Once we 
understand how property meets its own challenges, we will be in a position to 
see how problems involving intellectual property, water, spectrum, and so on—
what I will call “fluid resources”—can be, and sometimes are, solved rather 
than created by means of property institutions.  In particular, I will show that 
fluid resources are very likely to call for hybrid property systems combining 
private and common elements—a semicommons—and require much more 
fine-tuning through rules governing property use than do more-familiar kinds 
of resources. 
  To begin with, the notion of exclusion is not uncontroversial in property.  
People disagree about how central exclusion is to the notion of property (if there 
is such a notion!), and how far it should be pushed.4  Further, if we do 
 
2.  See, e.g., Karen Bakker, The “Commons” Versus the “Commodity”: Alter-globalization, 
Anti-privatization and the Human Right to Water in the Global South, 39 ANTIPODE 430 (2007); 
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317 (2000). 
3.  See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE 
FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); see also Jon M. Peha, Approaches to 
Spectrum Sharing, IEEE COMM. MAG. (Feb. 2005). 
4.  See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 30–32 (1996); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF 
PROPERTY IN LAW 68–74 (1997); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 275 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730, 731 (1998); see also Henry E. Smith, The Thing About Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. 
RTS. J. 95 (2014).  Trespass is a sovereignty-based tort.  See Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm 
Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215 (2006).  For use-based critiques of emphasizing exclusion, see, 
e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 17–28 (2011) 
(reviewing MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS 
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008)); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting 
the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 395–97 (2003).  For critiques of the importance of 
exclusion, see, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37–55 (2011); Gregory 
S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 
(2009). 
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implement exclusion strategies in “regular” property, they lead to many of the 
same problems identified in the controversies over intellectual property, water, 
and the other mentioned resources, but often to a lesser extent.  Whether for 
fluid or regular resources, exclusion always comes at a cost in terms of 
delineation and enforcement effort—and in terms of forgone harmless use.  
Intellectual property and water law problems are indeed problems, but they are 
property problems. 
And yet, the difficulties in intellectual property, water law, spectrum, and 
the like are in a sense special, and bear a family resemblance.  I will argue here 
that all these resources are “fluid” resources, and that it is precisely the 
intersection of fluid resources with the institutions of property that inevitably 
leads to challenges in managing potentially conflicting use.  Once we can 
account for the nature of that use and for the actual function of the property 
institutions, we will see that property law is not the villain of this piece, but a 
highly flexible set of tools that allows for a surprisingly wide range of 
institutional responses to conflict. 
What is a fluid resource?  I am going to argue that certain resources are not 
just hard to bound, but are even hard to separate into legal things.  Their uses 
are hard to isolate, period.  Just as a legal thing is similar to, but different from, 
a physical thing, so economic and legal “fluidity” is similar to but different 
from physical fluidity—physical fluidity will typically lead to legal fluidity.  
Physical fluids deform continuously under shearing stress, and they flow in 
characteristic ways; this makes it difficult to keep track of particular bits of a 
fluid (compared to solids), and the study of fluids is statistical and aggregate.5  
For our purposes, legally and economically fluid resources will be defined as 
those for which separation between groups of uses is difficult.6  As we will see, 
one way to pick out a broad class of uses for protection is to define a legal thing 
and protect it using an exclusion strategy.  By definition, this is difficult in the 
case of fluid resource because any separation into classes of uses is itself 
difficult.  Not impossible, though.  The question becomes which set of 
separations and other devices to employ—if any—to manage the complex set 
of potentially conflicting uses of these resources.  The problem is similar to, 
but a more extreme version of, that obtaining in the case of more-familiar non-
fluid resources. 
For the fluid resources we care most about, their fluidity leads to a dilemma.  
Many fluid resources are valued by multiple users and for multiple types of 
 
5.  See, e.g., BRUCE R. MUNSON ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FLUID MECHANICS 3 (7th ed. 
2013). 
6.  For an early take on this idea, see generally Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The 
Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445 (2008). 
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uses, sometimes on very different scales.  At the same time, because of the fluid 
nature of the resource, the uses cannot easily be kept separate for purposes of 
tracking by the legal system.  This has implications for how property will be 
delineated in such resources, if at all.  The strategies for delineation range 
between two poles.7  On one side are exclusion strategies, in which rough 
proxies of access are used to protect a range of uses.  Trespass and the ad 
coelum rule are the prototypical methods of implementing such a strategy.  At 
the other pole is governance, whose proxies focus in on smaller classes of uses 
for special treatment.  Many institutions can zero in on particularly important 
uses; nuisance, servitudes, and land use regulation all do so, even though very 
different institutions supply them.  In the case of fluid resources, we will see 
that the cost of exclusion and the benefits of singling out uses both push away 
from exclusion and toward governance, as a matter of degree. 
Thus, these resources are often subjected to a regime of semicommons, in 
which different interacting uses are subject to different property regimes, some 
private and some common.8  The problem is that when the uses interact and are 
not fully legally separated, actors can engage in strategic behavior—a user in 
one use may proceed with a view to gaining in another class of uses.  The 
incentives in a hybrid system can be worse than in pure private property or pure 
commons; sometimes strategic behavior will allow shifting more than a 
proportionate cost to others and grabbing disproportionate benefits.9  A 
historical example of a semicommons is the open-field system of medieval and 
early modern Europe, where peasants would own scattered long thin strips for 
purposes of grain-growing, which they would be obligated to throw open for 
common grazing after harvest and in fallow periods.10  Circumstantial evidence 
suggests that the thin, scattered strips prevented strategic behavior—
participants could not, during the common-use period favor, with extra manure 
land that would be theirs in the private-use period, and could not direct 
damaging trampling towards the strips of others.11 
This essay will begin with the notion of fluid property and the special 
problems to which it gives rise.  Part II will show how these problems are dealt 
with in water law. In Part III, a similar picture is painted for intellectual 
property.  The parallel institutions in both areas are more extremely 
governance-oriented, as we would expect from the delineation cost account.  I 
 
7.  Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S467 (2002). 
8.  Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000). 
9.  Id. 
10. Id.  
11. Id.  
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conclude with some thoughts on the use of property talk in intellectual property. 
I. FLUID PROPERTY 
If exclusion is controversial in water and intellectual property, this very 
controversy is not unknown to property law either.  In property theory itself 
there is a lively debate about the importance of, and desirability or 
undesirability of, exclusion.  One might think, though, that the debate is 
different, in that intellectual property and, for some purposes, water are nonrival 
resources.  This is true, but it should be kept in mind that one of the costs of 
exclusion in regular property is forgone use.  Not every use that an excluded 
actor would make of a resource would conflict with that of an owner or 
possessor.  And yet the right to exclude, combined with transaction costs, will 
preclude that kind of use, along with those that are truly harmful.  Trespass does 
not include a harm requirement, unlike the law of nuisance and many other 
torts. 
As noted in the introduction, exclusion has been a flashpoint in intellectual 
property as well as property.  In other works, I suggest that a fixation on 
exclusion—for or against—is often a stand-in for ambivalence over the role of 
the thing in property.  Thus, the right to exclude can be exaggerated as a sine 
qua non of property because it is doing the work of the thing as a starting 
point.12  While it is true that notions of possession and exclusion strategies key 
off the thing more directly than do governance strategies, effacing the role of 
the thing makes the “right to exclude” look like a particularly important stick 
in the bundle or an essential feature, which runs into trouble when we get to 
property rights such as easements.  By the same token, those who seek to 
deemphasize exclusion are often the ones who are most against property as a 
right in a thing, or who dismiss talk of things altogether.13 
When it comes to intellectual property, it might appear that some of the 
debate over exclusive rights might likewise be really about the problematic 
status of things in intellectual property.  And there is some truth to this, too.  
Nevertheless, the problem may loom larger than it needs to because of an 
impoverished notion of legal thing. 
Whether something is a thing depends on whether it can be treated 
separately.  This separation need not be absolute or complete.  Separation is 
also not the same phenomenon as exclusion.14  One can have a thing without 
 
12.  Smith, The Thing About Exclusion, supra note 4. 
13.  See, e.g., Tom Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 69–
80 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1980).  For discussion, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, 
What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357–58, 365 (2001). 
14.  PENNER, supra note 4. 
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exclusion, but exclusion depends on the thing.  Frederick Pollock defines a legal 
thing as “some possible matter of rights and duties conceived as a whole and 
apart from all others, just as, in the world of common experience, whatever can 
be separately perceived is a thing.”15  Picking up on this line of thought, James 
Penner sets forth, in addition to his thesis that exclusion is the formal basis of 
property (his exclusion thesis), an equally important separation thesis, which is 
a theory of the “thinghood” of objects of property: 
Only those “things” in the world which are contingently associated with 
any particular owner may be objects of property; as a function of the 
nature of this contingency, in theory nothing of normative consequence 
beyond the fact that the ownership has changed occurs when an object 
of property is alienated to another.16 
The nature of the thing helps determine what kind of property we can have 
in it.  There are actually two kinds of “thing” that are involved in property: 
actual things in the world and legal things.  The latter depends on the former.  
As Pollock notes: 
[O]n the whole perhaps we have good ground for saying that the “thing” 
of legal contemplation, even when we have to do with a material object, 
is not precisely the object as we find it in common experience, but rather 
the entirety of its possible legal relations to persons.  We say entirety, 
not sum, because the capacity of being conceived as a distinct whole is 
a necessary attribute of an individual thing.  What the relations of a 
person to a thing can be must depend in fact on the nature of the thing 
as continuous or discontinuous, corporeal or incorporeal, and in law on 
the character and the extent of the powers of use and disposal which 
particular systems of law may recognize.17 
Thus, the characteristics of physical things are easy for the law to track 
when defining legal things.  An umbrella as a legal thing is not that interestingly 
different from a physical umbrella.  When it comes to land, legal definition does 
more work, under the ad coelum rule.18  Exclusion, through the law of trespass, 
 
15.  Frederick Pollock, What Is a Thing?, 10 L.Q. REV. 318 (1894); see also FREDERICK 
POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 121 (1896) (“A thing is, in law, some possible matter of 
rights and duties conceived as a whole and apart from all others, just as, in the world of common 
experience, whatever can be separately perceived is a thing.”). 
16.  PENNER, supra note 4, at 111. 
17.  Pollock, supra note 15, at 320–21. 
18.  See generally Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 2083 (2009). 
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keys off this definition of the legal thing.19  Finally, when it comes to 
intangibles, legal definition does the most work.20 
There are costs and benefits to legal thinghood.  In terms of benefits, the 
question is how much our additional efforts at defining a legal thing promote 
the purposes of property.  For tangible objects this includes managing literally 
conflicting uses.  In the case of intangibles, uses do not conflict in this way.  
Instead, the purpose of defining intangibles is to have a method to get at 
something else—a set of activities, some of which may involve tangible 
resources.21  Thus, in intellectual property, the information itself is nonrival, 
but the legal thing is a stand-in for the activities and resources surrounding the 
information, much of which comes under the heading of commercialization.  
Therefore, labor, lab space, and resources used in marketing are all rival.  The 
returns from them are appropriable and more easily transferable because we 
can get at them through rights in legal things like inventions and expressions. 
This brings us to the cost side of the ledger.  While it is true that we tend to 
think of things as things when we want to define ownership in them,22 not 
everything is equally easy to delineate as a thing.  As already mentioned, there 
is an everyday ontology involving physical things that may well preexist our 
desire to establish ownership.  So, in the case of personal property, the ability 
to regard something as a separate thing is often not much of a constraint on 
property.  Cultural artifacts would be easy to treat as transferable commodities, 
but sometimes legislation prevents this.  The problem with slavery is that it is 
wrong—people are not legal things or objects of rights—not that it is hard to 
delineate rights in people.  Organs in place are not fully separable, but if one 
can own one leg of mutton,23 we might be able to delineate property rights in 
organs in place.  Nonetheless, this would be offensive from a moral and policy 
point of view. 
The constraint on the cost side of delineating things, and by extension rights 
to them, looms large for fluid property.  Fluid property is almost by definition 
property in things that are hard to separate.  Hard and thus costly, but not 
impossible. 
Separation into legal things is an example of modularity in law.24  
 
19.  See generally id. 
20.  See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 381, 417–19 (2005); see also Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property 
Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, 1080–92 (1997). 
21.  See generally Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, supra note 18.  
22.  Tony Honoré, Ownership, in MAKING LAW BIND 161, 179–81 (Oxford University Press 
1987). 
23.  Pollock, supra note 15, at 318–19. 
24.  See generally Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 
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Modularity is a matter of degree.25  If clusters of interactions can be found in 
which elements interact within the component, but not across component 
boundaries, the system is fully decomposable and modularity can be 
complete.26  More common is what Herbert Simon called near-
decomposability.27  A nearly decomposable system can be separated into 
modules such that that interaction is intense within the modules and relatively 
sparse between them.28  The intense interactions can thus happen inside without 
causing hard-to-predict ripple effects throughout the system.29 
In fluid resources, it is costly to achieve thingness in terms of both 
delineation and forgone benefit.  In other words, modularization is necessarily 
incomplete because a system of interactions surrounding such resources is a 
less decomposable system.  On the cost side, clusters of uses are harder to 
separate than they are in regular property.  Physical fluidity, as is well known, 
makes a resource hard to bound.  It is very hard to contain water, measure its 
flows (compared to measuring a solid object), and monitor use.  If boundary 
crossing can be used in the case of land as a proxy for violation in trespass and 
in much of the law of nuisance, this is not possible in water law.  And it is much 
more difficult in the case of intellectual property than for tangible property.  
Invention space is hard to describe, let alone to bound.30 
At the same time, multiple uses of fluid resources are highly beneficial.  In 
some ways this is the flip side of the cost.  If two uses of the resource are 
valuable, then it is highly unlikely that they can be separated.  So we will wind 
up with a rights structure or a collection of privileges that can be characterized 
as “multiple” use of a larger unbounded resource.  Or we can delineate things, 
but, again, it will be valuable for multiple actors to have “access.” 
Once we allow for multiple access, strategic behavior becomes a danger.  
In terms of the strategies for delineating property rights, we must either give up 
on property rights altogether or move to some kind of governance regime.  
Where multiple use is valuable, but not very separable, various more fine-
grained proxies will have to be used at the interface between legal modules (in 
intellectual property, things like inventions or expressions) in order to prevent 
 
(2012).  On modularity, see, e.g., CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER 
OF MODULARITY 58–59, 236–37, 257 (2000); HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 
209–10 (2d ed. 1981). 
25.  See generally Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 24.  
26.  See generally id.  
27.  Id. at 1701.  
28.  Id.  
29.  Id.  
30.  See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 
(2009); Peter S. Menell, Governance of Intellectual Resources and Disintegration of Intellectual 
Property in the Digital Age, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523 (2011). 
NIES LECTURE 2016 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2017  9:38 PM 
2016] SEMICOMMONS IN FLUID RESOURCES 203 
 
damaging spillovers from activities.  Again, this is not directly a matter of rival 
use.  If intellectual property gets indirectly at commercialization activities, the 
question is how someone else’s activity might interfere with appropriability and 
transferability.  Relatively on/off violations of rights are just a crude first cut.  
In fluid resources, this first cut is likely to be particularly rough.  Put differently, 
exclusion strategies, to the extent they can be used, will be especially indirect 
in the case of fluid resources.  And around this first cut, especially because of 
its crudeness, we need to deal with strategic behavior. 
All structures of property rights face what might be termed the Property 
Dilemma. Property’s modularization and separation facilitate specialization.  
Someone whose use is protected behind an exclusion strategy based on legal 
things will be the residual claimant to that thing.  As is true elsewhere, from 
organizations to computer programs, modularization promotes specialization.  
Owners can develop familiarity and even expertise in using their assets, secure 
in the ability to reap the reward.  Contracting for this kind of separation would 
be prohibitively costly.  Because this separation cannot be achieved by contract 
alone, it is a true contribution of property law.31  Separation is an “essential 
role” of property law.32 
Separation cannot be complete.  The system of interactions with respect to 
resources is, after all, only nearly decomposable (if that).  As a result, 
modularization and separation lead to the potential for strategic behavior 
(opportunism).  First of all, owners will care excessively about their assets and 
not for those of others or those of the public.  This is the familiar externality 
problem.  But wherever proxies for protecting uses are inaccurate, we have to 
worry about those who would exploit this gap.  On the owner side, there can be 
some spiteful behavior (spite fences) and what Dan Kelly calls strategic 
externalities: engaging in an offensive land use in order to be paid off.33  A 
classic example was the Chicago livery stable scam, in which someone would 
quickly open a livery stable in a residential area solely in order to be paid to 
 
31.  See Brian Angelo Lee & Henry E. Smith, The Nature of Coasean Property, 59 INT’L REV. 
ECON. 145–155 (2012).   
32.  See id. at 152; see also Henry E. Smith, Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for 
Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057, 1061 (2013).  I take the term “essential 
role” from Hansmann and Kraakman, who argued that affirmative asset-partitioning could not be 
achieved by contract and so was the essential role of organizational law.  Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 406–07 (2000).  They noted 
that asset partitioning was a “property” institution.  Id.  We can add that asset partitioning is a special 
case of more general separation into modules.  See Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 
24, at 1722. 
33.  See generally Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1667–68 
(2011). 
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shut down.34  Another type is extreme holdout behavior, which might be 
described as abuse of right.35  As we will see, exercises of rights against their 
purpose might lead to equitable withholding of remedies or even equitable 
intervention.  And the potential for opportunism exists on the non-owner side, 
too.  Even if a court gets damages right on average, a violator who can predict 
error can cherry-pick entitlements to violate.36  This, too, could lead to 
extortion. 
Strategic behavior leads to the use of governance strategies to delineate 
rights, and such governance strategies include equitable interventions.  There 
are many possible governance strategies, and it is an important question in 
comparative institutional analysis, which is the least bad problem of strategic 
behavior.  Most straightforwardly, rules of proper use limit the amount of an 
activity, such as grazing on a village common.  Occasionally, clever boundary 
placement can serve a governance function.  In the semicommons of the 
medieval open fields, carving the land into long thin strips in the private 
property period made strategic behavior costlier.37  Additionally, and more 
conventionally, rules of property use can be created by participants or 
governments to contain strategic behavior.38  Many of the examples dealt with 
by Elinor Ostrom involved large groups in control of a common pool of 
resources instituting governance regimes to solve the problems of conflict and 
overuse among themselves.39  Governance strategies will refer to particular 
relatively narrow classes of use.40  In real property, governance devices include 
servitudes, nuisance, and land use regulation.41  Each is supplied by a very 
different set of institutional actors, but all focus in on particular classes of uses, 
to a far greater extent than do exclusion strategies. 
For very systematic problems, new forms of separation and governance 
have been devised.  One can separate out control from beneficial ownership 
(the trust or corporation) or from possessory ownership (common-interest 
communities).  Far from being a challenge to notions of private property, as 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means thought,42 the separation of ownership and 
 
34.  Id. at 1645.  
35.  Id. at 1710–12.  
36.  See generally Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1774 
(2004). 
37.  Smith, Semicommon Property Rights, supra note 8, at 132. 
38.  See generally id. at 138–44. 
39.  See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); see also GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 29–34, 36–37 (1989). 
40.  Smith, supra note 7, at S455–56, S467–74. 
41.  Id. at S456. 
42.  See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
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control is property-like separation of a different, more refined sort.  Like other 
forms of modularization, this allows specialization at some cost of strategic 
behavior, including the agency costs familiar from the commentary on 
corporate law.43  Tom Merrill and I have termed this kind of property that 
allows for organizational-style separation “entity property.”44 
Finally, an important set of governance tools comes under the heading of 
equity.  As I argue elsewhere, equity is a targeted “meta” law—law about law.45  
Certain problems are worth the extra cost of solving at a higher level that can 
override the results of regular law.  In systems theory and cybernetics, this is 
referred to as “hierarchy.”46  Among the problems calling for this second-order 
intervention are what Lon Fuller called “polycentric tasks,” including complex 
conflicting rights.47  They also notably include opportunism,48 or what used to 
be called constructive fraud.49  As we will see, fluid property often involves 
complex interactions—due to lack of separation—and openings for 
opportunism.  As expected, equity has played an important role in both areas. 
II.  MANAGING WATER 
Water law has occupied an important and yet ambivalent place in property 
theory.  Water law is sometimes viewed as a challenge to conventional notions 
of property, especially those notions based around exclusion.50  Ironically, it is 
also used as support for such theories, at least when it comes to the emergence 
of prior appropriation in the western United States.51 
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Seeing property as the elaboration of separation and modularization in a 
system of complex interactions allows a different and more realistic account of 
water law.52 
Water is a fluid resource.  It is a literal fluid, and this is reflected in water 
law.  Water is notoriously hard to delineate.  In the formative period of water 
law, very rough measurement in terms of type and length of use was the best 
that could be done.53  Typically, measurement happens upon transfer (if 
allowed), in order to protect those with the right to return flow. 
Let’s start with riparianism, which is the system obtaining in most of the 
United States and in England.  Riparianism is based on reasonable use and thus 
can be analogized to nuisance.54  It is, therefore, clearly a governance regime.  
And, if anything, riparianism is moving further in that direction, as it is being 
subjected to a regulatory overlay. 
Yet there is more to riparianism than pure governance.  First, riparian rights 
are not open-ended.  They are appurtenant to adjacent land.55  This gives them 
an exclusive character even beyond the closed community that has access.56  By 
being appurtenant to land, they become part of the modular package of rights 
in land and thus rest on the foundation of exclusion in land law.57  Under 
riparianism, water rights cannot be severed from riparian land, and doctrines to 
prevent excessive fragmentation are required to police the rough proxy of 
adjacency to the watercourse, which defines access in this exclusionary 
regime.58  Further, water withdrawn from the watercourse can be used only on 
riparian land.59  Even some of the use-governance has a rough modular 
character, as where so-called natural wants such as drinking, household uses, 
and cattle raising have per se priority over artificial wants such as irrigation (in 
a nonarid climate) and power generation.60 
As with nuisance, riparianism involves evaluating conflicting rights and 
using rules of thumb to reconcile them.  Often this is done in the course of 
deciding on an injunction.  Equity courts played a major role. 
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Prior appropriation has received much attention from property theorists.  
Often it is taken as an example of the Demsetz Thesis, in which property rights 
emerge when resources increase in value and externalities become worse.61  In 
arid climates, we thus get more “parcelized” water law, as exemplified in the 
famous case of Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co.62  Carol Rose pointed out that the 
use of water in the East had more public-goods characteristics than in the West, 
and this helped shape water law in the two areas.63  Evidence of parcelization 
comes from its system of priorities based on first diversion for a beneficial use, 
and (in some times and places) its transferability. 
While it is true that prior appropriation does put in effort to define rights in 
water separately from land and in that sense is more exclusionary, upon closer 
look, prior appropriation is very much a governance regime, in keeping with 
the fluid character of the resource.  First of all, rights are defined in terms of 
use, and even quantification is based on rough measurement of use.  Prior 
appropriation does not give a right to all water diverted, but only so much as is 
consumed in the particular pattern of use at the time of diversion. 
Because of high measurement costs, and the benefits of multiple use, water 
is difficult to separate and requires more emphasis on advanced forms of 
separation and governance to contain strategic behavior.64  First of all, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that, in both use and transfer, there remain many 
important third-party effects.65  Partly this is the result of the desirability of 
multiple use.  Strikingly, return flows are appropriable by downstream users.  
This probably allows for more thorough use of the watercourse at any given 
time, but at the cost of making transfers more cumbersome.66  In a further 
governance aspect of the system, transfers are subject to the no-injury rule, 
which means that in a transfer the new diversion point and the new use cannot 
place a greater impact on downstream junior appropriators than the old use 
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did.67  As with riparianism if not more so, prior appropriation is being overlaid 
with public regulation. 
Unlike riparianism, organizational—or entity—property plays a large role 
in prior appropriation.68 Additional internalization is achieved by institutions 
that can be characterized as entity property.69  Mutuals and water districts allow 
for separation of a group or a watershed for separate legal treatment.70  They 
promote modules of an extended sort.  Within these overall modules, there is 
separation of function inside the entity, in terms of management and use.71  
Water entities, especially mutuals, make intra-entity transfers of water much 
smoother than corresponding external transfers.72  Water districts mix entity 
property and public functions.73 
Finally, equity has played a major role in prior appropriation law.74  This is 
expressed in the full arsenal of equitable principles, such as maxims and 
defenses, when courts consider injunctions.75  Courts also can draw on equitable 
apportionment doctrine to solve particular problems of conflicting rights in 
interstate contexts.76  Apportionment is a classic example of the second-order 
solution to problems of complex, conflicting rights. And equity courts had 
historic equity jurisdiction over custom, which was a source of early prior-
appropriation water law.77 
In both riparian and prior-appropriation systems, private and public rights 
interlock so tightly that it makes sense to see them as different versions of 
semicommons.78  The elaborate structures are a response to the access afforded 
by the mix of private and common property elements in the system of water 
law. 
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III. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SEMICOMMONS 
Information is a fluid resource, as discussed earlier.  As with water, 
separation and exclusion are costly, and multiple interlocking uses are 
desirable.  Thus, from both ends, intellectual property cannot rely on even 
nearly accurate rules of access.  The on/off proxies on offer do an even worse 
job than those in tangible property at getting at the class of uses we are 
interested in.  This is particularly true because the proxies used in intellectual 
property are at some remove from the rival resources they are protecting—the 
resources that go into commercialization, in particular.79  Thus, what we are left 
with are crude exclusion devices and heavier use of governance.  In intellectual 
property, we find both. 
To begin with, exclusion has its limits in intellectual property.  This is well 
known in some of its aspects.  Nevertheless, exclusion serves a similar function 
to that in regular property—but at some remove.  Intellectual property and 
patent law, in particular, employ modular, indirect exclusion rights to help solve 
a complex coordination problem of attributing returns to rival inputs to 
development of nonrival information.80  Because accurate exclusion proxies are 
unavailable, a combination of crude exclusion and extensive governance must 
be used (if anything will be).81  A major difference between patent and 
copyright is that there is more reliance in the former on crude exclusion than 
there is in copyright.82  Modularity is particularly important in patent law where 
commercialization looms large.83  And thing-style delineation is probably even 
more difficult in copyright than in patent law.84  As is familiar, an expression 
is inherently difficult to isolate.  Copyright employs use more in terms of 
entitlement definition.85 
In both patent and copyright, the semicommons is a major element, and 
much of the recent work on semicommons comes from the intellectual property 
area.86  The doctrine of fair use in copyright creates a semicommons where 
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NIES LECTURE 2016 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2017  9:38 PM 
210 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 20:2 
 
private and public rights interact over the same resource.87  In patent law, norms 
of scientific research have, at least until recently, allowed for sharing with 
fellow academics and private exclusion with respect to commercial users.88  
Many of the collective-rights and standardizing organizations that grow up 
around intellectual property rights mix private and public rights in a 
semicommons.89 
Indeed, when holders of intellectual property rights contract in a group, the 
result is often a complex mix of private and group entitlements.  This goes for 
contracts for joint ventures and looser organizations governing collective 
rights, such as copyright organizations and patent pools.  It is even true in a 
limited way in standard-setting organizations, where much attention has been 
given to the problems of potential strategic behavior in which participants will 
let their (perhaps hidden) private intellectual property interests affect their 
behavior with respect to deliberations on the choice of standards.90  A variety 
of governance mechanisms, including equitable intervention, are used (and can 
be used further) to contain such strategic behavior.91 
As in regular property, servitudes are also a major contracted-for source of 
governance for intellectual property.  In intellectual property, licenses tend to 
be more robust than in regular property.  They are the means by which owners 
of intellectual property can set up a governance structure around specific rights.  
Through doctrines like exhaustion in patent law and first sale in copyright law, 
the law sets limits on what can be accomplished through intellectual property 
licenses, and some limits make sense in keeping property rights from becoming 
too idiosyncratic and expansive.  Intellectual property licenses present 
problems that go beyond those of regular property.  Molly Van Houweling 
shows that these “new servitudes” present greater problems of notice and the 
potential to conflict downstream.92  These problems are related to the fluid 
nature of the property.  As an example of conflict, Van Houweling considers 
GPL Version 2 and the Wikipedia GNU Free Documentation License, each of 
which requires licensees who are incorporating the work to license their own 
work on the same terms.93  The specific terms of openness can require different 
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conflicting actions.94  This is less of a problem in real property, in which 
easements are tied to non-overlapping areas.  Likewise, “new servitudes” can 
exceed the entitlement baseline, as Microsoft’s Vista EULA exceeded the 
copyright baseline.95  By contrast, in real property, the thing-based bubble 
around land (and similarly for chattels) prevents this leakage from the modules. 
Finally, equity has a role to play in countering strategic behavior in 
intellectual property law.  As Gergen, Golden, and I have argued, when the 
United States Supreme Court adopted in eBay v. MercExchange96—under the 
banner of “traditional principles of equity,” a novel four-part test for issuing 
injunctions, it replaced, ironically, a more traditional approach that was tailored 
well for dealing with opportunistic behavior.97  Under the eBay test, the movant 
must show: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available 
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.98 
Unlike the truly traditional approach to injunctions, this test makes no 
reference to good faith, which is directly tied to opportunism.  Although the test 
mentions “disproportionate hardship,” traditionally that formula described a 
safety valve in situations where an injunction would normally issue, but where 
there was gross disparity of hardship on the defendant.  The disproportionate or 
undue hardship defense was not a balancing test seeking equipoise.99  When 
dealing with opportunism, there is a strong case for the traditional 
disproportionate-hardship defense in the patent realm.100  Also, the traditional 
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98.  eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391. 
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gross-disparity approach allowed courts to take into account the possibility of 
opportunism not just on the part of patent-owning trolls, but also on the part of 
potential infringers, who might use the possibility of undercompensatory 
damages as a weapon.101 
Likewise, in standard-setting organizations, some of the problems of 
opportunism can be handled by equity.  Doctrines like unclean hands and 
estoppel—in addition to the real, traditional approach to injunctions—can 
counteract unfair surprise that may come up.102  Limited enforcement of custom 
can also have an anti-opportunism effect. 
CONCLUSION 
Property rights involve separation along various dimensions, promoting 
specialization at the cost of inviting strategic behavior.  Because separation is 
especially difficult and multiple use is especially important in fluid resources, 
fluid property is likely to be subject to a semicommons.  In property—
“regular,” intellectual, and entity—a range of governance regimes, some off the 
rack and some contractual, can deal partially with strategic behavior stemming 
from separation.  These tools are especially prominent in both water law and 
intellectual property, as expected for a fluid property regime. 
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